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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

R. W. FRANK AND COMP ANY,
a Corporation, and UNITED
FIDELITY &
GCARANTY CO., a Corporation,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

Case No.

12624

THE INDUSTRIAL

OF UTAH and
JIMMIE J. ARKOUDAS,
Defendants.

REPLY BRIEF
The defendants on page 12 of their Brief claim that
notice of the accident was given to the employer as
required by § 35-1-99 and to support this assertion they
quote the following testimony of the applicant:
''Q. You u·rrc aware that you. were supposed
to report these matters to your supervisor?
A. I did.
1

Q. And when was it you talked with him
relative to when this incident occurred?
A. This last one?

Q. Yes. How soon after?
A. vVell, I would say two days, when I had,
when I saw - well, to, three days after, when I
saw Doctor Morrow. And then, I had to lay he laid me up in bed for five days."
(R. 33). (Emphasis added).
This excerpt from the applicant's testimony as
quoted on page 12 of that brief is misleading, however,
because as pointed out at pages 4 and 5 of that same
brief, the applicant went on to explain precisely what he
told his supervisor with regard to the so-called accident.
The balance of the applicant's testimony on that matter
is as follows :

"Q. And now specifically what did you tell Mr.
Mickelsen?
A. I told hini that I saw the doctor, and that
I, he told me to stay home for five days, flat on
my back, don't even get up to go to the bathroom.

Q. Well, wlwt else did you tell him?
A. That's all.

Q. So you didn't at that time tell him that you
hurt your back while lifting this paint'?
A. In those words, no.
2

to

Q. Well, what did you tell him with respect

A. \Vell, with respect to that, I -

let's see.

Well, other than that what I - when I told
him what Dr. Morrow told me, I can't remember
of arnything.

Q. In other words, you can't remember of
telli11g 111 r. lllickelsen anything a,t that time except
yon had been to the ,doctor cind had been told to
lay off work for five days.

A. Uh huh. Yes.

Q. All right.
Now you then went back to work agarn
after five days'?
A. Yes. It was on a vVednesday I went to
heel, and I got up Sunday, and the following
Monday I went back to work.
Q. And did you talk with either Mr. Mickelsen
or l\lr. Frank when you went back to work, that
you recall 1

A. \V ell, I talked to Mr. Mickelsen.
Q. What was it you told him 1

A. He asked nie how I'm feeling, arnd I says,

•J 'm vretty good,' I says, 'bid I'm sore.'
Q. Whal else did you tell him?
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A. That's all.
Q. That's ,all.

A. That I remeniber." (R. 34-35.) (Emphasit:1
added.)
As the testimony on cross-examination above quoted
clearly shows, the only notice or knowledge that the
employer had was that the applicant had been to see the
doctor, presumably with respect to his long-standing
back disability.
T'he case of Alvarado vs. Tucker, 268 P.2d 986, 2
Utah 2d 16 (1954), establishes the rule that the testimony
of a party is no stronger than it is left on cross-examination. Also, the Alvarado case holds that a particular part
of a witness' testimony may not be singled out to the
exclusion of other parts of equal importance bearing
on the subject.
1

The evidence m the present case, viewed in this
light, establishes clearly that the only notice 'the employer
had of this alleged accident was notice of the fact that
the applicant had been to a doctor for a backache which
was in all respects consistent with his long-standing
complaints of recurring back pain.
It is urged in Defendants' Brief that there was no
prejudice to the plaintiffs by the lack of notice and that
the applicant should, accordingly, prevail notwithstanding the lack of notice. However, it cannot be seriously
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urged that the delay of almost two years from January
H, 19G8 until the first notice of claim or injury was given
to the plaintiffa, was not prejudicial especially in view of
the total failure of the applicant to report any supposed
employment-related accident and injury to his doctors
and his representations to the non-occupational health
insurer that the claim was not based on accident.
this is the very situation the notice provision of the
statute was designed to protect against.
Further, the suggestion that in the, absence of prejudice the applicant should prevail is not only unsupported by any Utah case, but it directly contradicts the
dear, unequivocal and unqualified mandate of Section
35-1-99, which states:
''If no notice of the accident and injury is
given to the employer within one year from the
date of the accident, the right to compensation
shall be wholly barred. (Emphasis added.)
It will be noted, moreover, that aHhough Section
33-1-99 contains a provision for constructive notice with
respect to a reduction penalty of 15% for failure to
report
"forty-eight hours, when possible" no such
qualification is provided with respect to the requirement
that notice of the ''accident and injury" be given within
one year of the accident as a condition precedent to the
award of any compensation whatever.

CONCLUSION
The testimony of the applicant himself as he
explained his conduct fully on cross-examination, shows
clearly that no notice of an ''accident" was ever given to
his employer. Further, his claim that because there was
no prejudice to the plaintiffs he should prevail disregards the very purpose of this notice requirement of
the statute and is unsupported by any Utah cases. More
important, such a position directly contradicts the
express provisions of the statute itself.
Respectfully submitted,
Earl J. Groth
Attorney for Plaintiffs
501 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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